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THE UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION UNDER THE
RAILWAY LABOR AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACTS
By

BENJAMIN AARONt

I. ORIGIN OF THE DUTY

T IS an interesting fact that a union's duty of fair representation, although frequently enforced by courts in cases arising under the Railway
Labor Act (RLA)' and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' is
not expressly mentioned in either statute. Nevertheless, the duty has been
inferred from the powers delegated by Congress to unions under both statutes,' and today's critical issues involve not the existence of the duty, but

rather its scope and the
Judicial recognition
rather slow in coming,
The main thrust of the

means by which it may be enforced.
of the union's duty of fair representation was
for reasons that, in retrospect, seem clear enough.
RLA and the NLRA (Wagner Act) of 1935 was

against employers, whose resistance to unionism presented the chief obstacle
to effectuating the emerging national labor policy in the 1930's. 4 Neither
statute specified any criminal acts or unfair labor practices by unions.
The more common types of unfair discrimination by unions against those

for whom they were the exclusive bargaining representatives--e.g., failure
to process legitimate grievances-were difficult to prove and harder still
to redress.
The power of exclusive representation delegated to unions under the

two statutes made it inevitable, however, that courts would read into them
a corresponding duty by unions to exercise that power reasonably and
fairly.
A. Right Of Exclusive Representation
Section 2, Fourth of the RLA provides that the majority of any "craft

or class" shall choose the bargaining representative, which thereupon becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees in the appropriate
unit. Minority groups within the union, or nonunion groups within the
bargaining unit, are not allowed either to choose another representative or
t Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los
Angeles.
1 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. S§ 151-62 (1964).
261 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. SS 151-68 (1964), amending 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
'Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 223
F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1956).
"See, e.g., § 1 of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935): "The
denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept
the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest,
which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce..
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to engage in individual bargaining over matters properly within the scope
of collective bargaining.'
Under section 2, Ninth of the RLA, the National Mediation Board
(NMB) has exclusive authority to investigate and resolve all disputes over
the designation of bargaining representatives. Its certification is final and
not subject to court review.' Upon receipt of this certification, the carrier
becomes obligated to "treat with the representative so certified as the
representative of the craft or class."'
The Wagner Act paralleled the RLA in many respects and similarly
avoided dealing with the relations between unions and their members.
Section 9 (a) provided that "the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes," could choose their bargaining representatives,
who thereupon became the "exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining." As under the RLA,
minority groups within the union, or nonunion groups within the bargaining unit, could neither choose another representative nor engage in
individual bargaining over matters properly within the scope of collective
bargaining.!
The Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947
(LMRA) amended section 9 (a) in some respects,9 but did not significantly
affect the duly recognized or certified union's power of exclusive representation.
B. Individual ParticipationIn Grievance Settlement
By hypothesis, the problem of fair representation concerns individuals
and small groups whose views and claims run counter to those of the majority. Adequate machinery exists in most cases for the ousting of a bargaining representative that no longer has the support of a majority of
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit."0 It is by no means clear,
however, that individuals and small groups have adequate means to enforce their rights to equal representation, and, as will be seen from the
following brief resume, it is absolutely certain that the statutory procedures for the individual presentation of grievances under the RLA and
the NLRA are insufficient for that purpose.
'Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
'Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297 (1943); cf. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks
v. Association for Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
"The Mediation Board makes no 'order.' And its only ultimate finding of fact is the certificate. . . . The function of the Board under S 2, Ninth is more the function of a referee. To this
decision of the referee Congress has added a command enforcible by judicial decree." Switchmen's
Union v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297, 304 (1943).
8
J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678 (1944).
'See text immediately following note 21, infra.
s E.g., NLRA, 5 9(c) (1) (A) (ii). "If there is a certified or currently recognized representative, any employee, or group of employees, or any individual or labor organization acting in their
behalf may also file decertification proceedings [sic) to test the question of whether the certified
or recognized agent is still the representative of the employees." NLRB Statements of ProcedureSeries 8, 29 C.F.R. S 101.17 (1968). Cf. RLA, S 2, Ninth; NMB Regs., 29 C.F.R. § 1206.2
(1968).
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1. Individual ParticipationUnder the Railway Labor Act
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Elgin, J. L E. Ry. v. Burley,"
the railroad unions generally denied the individual employee the right to
process his own grievance, on the theory that, as exclusive bargaining representatives, they had full authority to settle grievances as well as negotiate collective agreements. In Burley, however, Justice Rutledge, speaking
for a bare majority of the Court, drew a distinction between "disputes
concerning the making of collective agreements" and "disputes over grievances," characterizing the former as those which "look to the acquisition
of rights for the future" and the latter as those which relate "either to the
meaning or proper application of a particular provision [of an existing
agreement] with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case.""'
Thus, the union's exclusive authority to make or change collective agreements did not extend to "changing them with retroactive effects upon
accrued rights or claims."" It followed, therefore, that "[f]or an award
to affect the employee's rights, . . . more must be shown than that the
collective agent appeared and purported to act for him. It must appear
that in some legally sufficient way he authorized it to act in his behalf.'""
Upon rehearing, the Court, although reaffirming its decision, modified its
earlier statements by conceding that the union's authority to settle individual grievance claims might be inferred from the language of the union
constitution.
Nevertheless, there has continued to be a significant difference between
the statutory rules applicable to the processing of individual grievances
and the actual practice. Under section 3, First (i) of the RLA, unsettled
controversies "between an employee or groups of employees and a carrier
or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions"
are referred to the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB)," a bipartite agency composed of 36 members, half of whom are selected by
the carriers and half by unions "national in scope."" The NRAB is divided
into four divisions, each with a separate and exclusive jurisdiction." A
deadlock within any division is broken by the decision of a neutral referee
chosen by the division members or, if they cannot agree, by the NMB."'
According to section 3, First (j) of the RLA,
"325

U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).

"325

U.S. at 723.

I Id. at 739.
4Id. at 738.
Is However, under § 3, Second, by mutual agreement, "any individual carrier, system, or groups
of carriers and any classes of its or their employees" may establish their own private arbitration
machinery as a substitute for the NRAB. This section was recently amended to provide, with respect to "disputes otherwise referable to the Adjustment Board, or any dispute which has been
pending before the . . . Board for twelve months from the date the dispute (claim) is received
by the Board," that either the union or the carrier can insist as a matter of right upon the establishment of a special board of adjustment within 30 days. Pub. L. No. 89-456, § 1 (20 June 1966).
"' Section 3, First (a) - (h). In disputed cases the final decision whether a union is "national in
scope" rests with the Secretary of Labor. Section 3, First (f).
"rSection 3, First (h).
as Section 3, First (i).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 34

Parties may be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives,
as they may respectively elect, and the several divisions of the Adjustment
Board shall give due notice of all hearings to the employee or employees and
the carrier or carriers involved in any disputes submitted to them.

This provision has been more honored in the breach than in the observ.
ance.
The hostility of the NRAB to claims presented by individuals or by
minority or dissident groups is not surprising, because those claims have,
for one reason or another, already been rejected by the very unions represented on the NRAB division to which they are presented. Thus, the
administrative machinery established by the RLA for resolving labormanagement disputes has developed its own procedures tending to facilitate avoidance by unions of their duty of fair representation and has
thereby necessitated intrusion by the courts into the areas of private
collective bargaining and internal union affairs.
2. Individual Participation Under the National Labor Relations Act
A proviso to section 9 (a) of the Wagner Act declared: "That any individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer." In the leading case of Hughes Tool
Co."° the Board interpreted the proviso to mean
that individual employees and groups of employees are permitted "to present
grievances to their employer" by appearing in behalf of themselves-although
not through any labor organization other than the exclusive representativeat every stage of the grievance procedure, but that the exclusive representative is entitled to present and negotiate at each such stage concerning the disposition to be made of the grievance. .
. Failing agreement of all three
parties, any dissatisfied party may carry the grievance through subsequent
machinery until the established grievance procedure is exhausted."'

In 1947 the section 9 (a) proviso was amended by adding to the provision quoted above the following language:
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, that the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
"9See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Swan, 214 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1954); Comment, Railroad Labor Disputes and the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 18 U. CI. L. REV. 303 (1951).
In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 205 (1944), the Court observed: "The Adjustment Board has consistently declined in more than 400 cases to entertain grievance complaints by
individual members of a craft represented by a labor organization." In Allain v. Tummon, 212
F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 194), the court of appeals reported that, despite its frequent admonitions
to desist, the NRAB was still "limiting notice of claims to the railroad brotherhood that files a
claim and to the railroad against which the claim is filed, and . . . notice is never given to the
individuals whose employment rights may be adversely affected if the claim is granted." The court
also noted that if the individual plaintiffs in this case or the minority union representing them
had otherwise obtained knowledge of the rival claim pending before the NRAB and had appeared
before the appropriate division, "they would not have been permitted to file a written submission,
offer testimony, cross-examine witnesses, make an agreement in their behalf, or otherwise participate in, said hearing."
205 6 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944).
11Id. at 982-83.
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The amended proviso has been construed by the NLRB as not permitting
presentation of individual grievances by a union other than the designated
bargaining representative," and as not requiring an employer to bargain
with anyone other than the certified bargaining representative." Moreover,
the proviso has consistently been construed as not granting to individuals
the right to demand arbitration of their grievances when the union refuses

to do so.2'
A major difference in the administrative machinery of the RLA and the
NLRA is that under the former the great majority of unsettled grievances
end up on the docket of the NRAB, whereas under the latter they are not
cognizable by the NLRB and are referred to private arbitration under
individual collective agreements. Although these private arbitration procedures are more various and flexible than those of the NRAB, problems of
fair representation by unions of nonmembers or of dissident members can
and do arise.' These problems will be discussed in greater detail below; for
the moment it is sufficient to note that the section 9 (a) proviso is, in itself,
no more adequate than the previously described procedures of the NRAB
as a safeguard against unfair representation of individual employees or
minority groups.
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY

A. Administrative Enforcement Under The Railway Labor Act
Given the pervasive racial discrimination on the railroads, to say
nothing of the high incidence of jurisdictional disputes between the railroad unions, it would be reasonable to assume that some administrative
policies would have been devised over the years to compel unions covered by
the RLA to observe their obligations of fair representation. There is no
evidence, however, that any effective policies of this kind have been developed.
During a period of widespread and particularly vicious racial discrimination by the major railroad unions, 6 the NMB announced:
The Board has definitely ruled that a craft or class of employees may not
be divided into two or more on the basis of race or color for the purpose of
choosing representatives. All those employed in the craft, or class regardless
of race, creed or color must be given2 the opportunity to vote for the representatives of the whole craft or class. j
This policy, though fair on its face, was also a rather shabby concealment
of the basic evil which it did not touch: being in the minority, Negroes
could not affect the outcome of representation elections under the RLA;
and in any case, they usually had only a Hobson's choice between two or
2Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 649 (1953); but see Douds v. Local 1250, Retail,
Wholesale, Dep't Store Union, 173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949).
13 Dowds v. Local 1250, Retail, Wholesalers & Dep't Store Union, 173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949).
24 Textron Puerto Rico (Tricot Div.), 107 N.L.R.B. 583 (1953).
5 See, e.g.,,Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 OHIO ST.
L.J. 2639, 49-54 (1961).
See H. NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO, ch. III (1944).
27
NMB, THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 17 (1940).
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more discriminatory unions to which they would be denied membership
or be admitted only as second-class members with no effective rights."
Attempts by Negro railroad employees to form their own organizations
in order to protect their jobs were thwarted by the NMB policy of avoiding "unnecessary multiplication of subcrafts and subclasses" and of maintaining "the customary grouping of employees into crafts and classes as

it has been established by accepted practice over a period of years in the
making of wage and rule agreements."'" Minority groups have not fared
any better in disputes submitted to the NRAB. Of the various Negro
labor organizations in the railroad industry, only those representing sleeping-car porters and dining-car employees have been held to be "national
in scope" and therefore eligible to be represented on the NRAB. ° As a
consquence, groups of Negro railroad workers have consistently been deprived of various rights without being accorded even the rudiments of
due process."
Not all the questions concerning fair representation have arisen in cases
of alleged racial discrimination; others are discussed in a later section of this
article. Enough has been said already, however, to indicate that the chances
are negligible that the NRAB will give sympathic consideration, or any
consideration at all, to complaints of unfair representation by an individual or by a small group of employees. Accordingly, such relief as can
be obtained is available only in the courts.
B. Administrative Enforcement Under The National Labor Relations Act
The jurisdiction of the NLRB over disputes arising out of the collective
bargaining process has always been limited.' Nevertheless, even under the
Wagner Act the Board had the power to act in certain types of cases involving alleged unfair union representation, and this authority was, of
course, greatly expanded by the Taft-Hartley amendments designating
specific types of conduct as union unfair labor practices.
Unlike the RLA (until the 1951 amendments),' the Wagner Act permitted various types of union security agreements, including the closed
2sSee, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. United Transp. Service Employees, 137 F.2d 817
(D.C. Cir.), Y'ev'd, 320 U.S. 715 (1943).
291 NMB ANN.

REP. 21

(1935).

"0United Transport Service Employees, for example, was not considered "national in scope" at
a time when it represented redcaps on 33 percent of the nation's Class I railway mileage, as well as
a substantial proportion of train porters and dining car employees; whereas during the same period,
the Switchmen's Union, representing yard foremen, helpers, and switch-tenders on only 11 percent
of the Class I railway mileage, was so classified and participated in the selection of representatives
on the First Division. 14 NMB ANN. REP. 30 (1948); H. NORTHRUP, supra note 26, at 66.
s See note 19 supra.
" ,. . . Congress determined that the Board should not have general jurisdiction over all alleged
violations of collective . . . agreements and that such matters should be placed within the jurisdiction of the courts. . . . To have conferred upon the . . . Board generalized power to determine
the rights of parties under all collective agreements would have been a step toward governmental
regulation of the terms of those agreements. We view Congress' decision not to give the Board that
broad power as a refusal to take this step." NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 427-28
(1967).
33In 1951 Congress amended S 2 of the RLA by adding a new paragraph, Eleventh, authorizing
carriers and duly designated unions to include union security and checkoff provisions in their collective agreements. 64 Stat. 1238 (1951).
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shop; and both union and nonunion workers received some protection
from the NLRB against discriminatory discharge from employment resulting from arbitrary denial of admission to the union or expulsion from
it." But because the Act specified no unfair labor practices by unions, this
relief could be obtained only in Board proceedings against employers who
had either acted collusively with the union or yielded to its illegal pressure.
Although the Wagner Act did not expressly empower the NLRB to
revoke certifications, the Board claimed that authority, arguing that "when
the certification ceases to effectuate the policies of the Act, or when its
continued existence would be contrary to settled principles adopted
by the Board in the enforcement of the Act, it may be revoked."' Yet
despite occasional threats to revoke the certification of any union which
refused to grant equal status to all employees in the bargaining unit for
which it was the exclusive bargaining representative," the Board waited
until 1964 to overrule previous decisions holding "that unions which exclude employees from membership on racial grounds, or which classify
or segregate members on racial grounds, may obtain or retain certified
status under the Act. ' m
Among the union unfair labor practices specified by the Taft-Hartley
amendments to section 8 of the NLRA are the following:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7: Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein ... ;
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of section 8(a) (3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied
or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic
dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership;
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is the
representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 9 (a)....
It is clear from the hearings and debates preceding adoption of the
Taft-Hartley Act that Congress had no intention of regulating the ad'E.g.,
Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44
N.L.R.B. 587 (1942), clarified, 46 N.L.R.B. 1043 (1943). See Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 ILL. L. REV. 425, 442-45 (1949).
' Cramp Shipbuilding Corp., 52 N.L.R.B. 309, 310-11 (1943); see also, Shell Petroleum Corp.,
52 N.L.R.B. 313 (1943)
(partial revocation of prior certification to exclude certain employees
from unit).
36E.g., U.S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382 (1943); Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 53
N.L.R.B. 999 (1943); Carter Mfg. Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 804 (1944); Southwestern Portland Cement
Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1945); General Motors Corp. (Chevrolet Shell Div.), 62 N.L.R.B. 427
(1945); Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 973 (1945); Larus & Bro. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075
(1945).

" Independent Metal Workers Union, Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964);
see note 36 supra and 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 17-18 (1945). The decision in Hughes Tool was foreshadowed in Pioneer Bus. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962) (normal contract-bar rules not applicable
to racially discriminatory agreement).
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missions policies of unions;' its sole concern in this regard was to make
sure that no union could enforce a union security provision against those
employees in a bargaining unit for whom the union was the exclusive
bargaining representative and at the same time refuse to admit them to
membership for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons.
With respect to unions that exercised the rights of exclusive bargaining
representation, without benefit of a union security clause, on behalf of
employees denied membership on an equal basis, the amended statute
was unclear. Similarly, it made no specific reference to the union's duty to
represent fairly all members of the bargaining unit.
In the fifteen years following adoption of the Taft-Hartley amendments
the NLRB did not find a union guilty of an unfair labor practice for violating its duty of fair representation in a single case. Then, in a dramatic
reversal of policy in 1962, the Board held in Miranda Fuel Co."5 that
section 7 of the NLRA "gives employees the right to be free from unfair
or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent
in matters affecting their employment"; 0 that "section 8 (b) (1) (A) .. .
accordingly prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory
representative capacity, from taking action against any employee upon
considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair";"
and that a statutory bargaining representative also violates section 8 (b) (2)
"when, for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair
classification, the union attempts to cause or does cause an employer to
derogate the employment status of an employee." ' By the same token, the
Board held that any employer yielding to a union's request to discriminate
against an employee in any of the prescribed ways violates section 8 (a) (1)
and (3).
The Miranda case did not involve charges of racial discrimination. The
union had successfully demanded that the employer drop one of its members to the bottom of the seniority list, ostensibly because the member had
left work prior to the commencement of the employer's slack season, contrary to the express terms of the collective agreement. Nevertheless, the
Board's decision was hailed as a major breakthrough by organizations
battling racial discrimination by unions, and the new policy was promptly
applied in cases in which the union was found to have refused to process
grievances solely because the grievants were Negroes."3 In these cases the
Board also found a violation of section 8 (b) (3).
" Indeed, Congress specifically disavowed, albeit rather cryptically, that there was any intent
to interfere with existing admissions policies of unions practicing racial discrimination. The House
Conference Report pointed out that the S 8 (b) (I) (A) proviso would not "disturb arrangements
in the nature of those approved by the . . . [NLRB] in Larus & Brother Co." H.R. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947).
'9140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
40140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
41
1d. at 185.
4Id. at 186.
" Independent Metal Workers Union, Local I (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964);
Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Galveston Maritime Ass'n), 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964);
Local 12, United Rubber Workers (Business League of Gadsden), 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964).
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The Board's theories have met with a mixed reception in the courts;"
we shall return to those decisions later in this discussion. At the moment,
however, it is sufficient to note that the NLRB, albeit belatedly, has moved
far ahead of the NMB and the NRAB in providing administrative redress
for violations of the union's duty of fair representation.
III.

JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY

A. JudicialEnforcement Under The Railway Labor Act: Railroads
1. Racial Discrimination
The first major judicial interventions under the RLA were in cases involving racial discrimination. The early concentration of Negroes in certain jobs (notably that of fireman-helper and porter-brakeman) and the
subsequent impact of technological changes that reduced total employment and drastically altered the nature of some assignments were principal
causes for the pervasive patterns of discrimination against Negroes in the
railroad industry. The railroad unions, as we have seen, although exclusively representing classes or crafts that included Negroes, denied them
admission to membership or limited their participation to auxiliary bodies
that were without any real voice in union affairs. Eventually, however,
the unions realized that this form of discrimination was not enough for
their purposes because it did not provide the means of ousting Negro incumbents from jobs desired by white union members. This was particularly
true in the case of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemer
(BLFE), whose members coveted the desirable firemen jobs held by
Negroes on diesel locomotives on southern railroads. Accordingly, the
BLFE entered into collusive agreements with a number of southern carriers
providing for the removal of Negro firemen from their jobs.' These
machinations led eventually to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in

Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R."
On the basic issue of whether a union can constitutionally exclude from
full membership any person for whom it is the exclusive bargaining representative, the Steele case broke no new ground; for in tacitly endorsing
the principle that a union can fairly represent in collective bargaining one
whom it has rejected as a member for "obviously irrelevant and invidious"
reasons, the Court was merely reinforcing the old "separate but equal"
fallacy." The more important and more durable contribution of the Steele
decision was its explication of the union's general duty of fair representa44Compare NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), supra note 39, with
NLRB v. Local 1367, Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), enforcing Local
1367, ILA (Galveston Maritime Ass'n), supra note 43, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), and
Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), enforcing Local 12,
United Rubber Workers (Business League of Gadsden), supra note 43, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837
(1967).
'See, generally, R. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR, chs. 7, 10 (1965); H.
supra note 26; M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
PLOYMENT, ch. 6 (1966).
NORTHRUP,

46323 U.S. 192 (1944).
7
" Id. at 203.
48See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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EM-

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 34

tion arising out of its authority as exclusive bargaining representative:
Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to represent
non-union members of the craft, at least to the extent of not discriminating
against them as such in the contracts which it makes as their representative,
the minority would be left with no means of protecting their interests or,
indeed, their right to earn a livelihood by pursuing the occupation in which
they are employed . . . The fair interpretation of the statutory language
is that the organization chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not
against those whom it represents. It is a principle of general application that
the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf,
and that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty
toward those for whom it is exercised unless so expressed."
Accordingly, the union, in the course of "collective bargaining and in
making contracts with the carrier, . . . [must] represent non-union or
minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly,
impartially, and in good faith.""9 This duty includes the obligation "to
consider requests of non-union members of the craft and expressions of
their views with respect to collective bargaining with the employer and to
give to them notice of the opportunity for hearing under its proposed
action." 1
An equally significant holding in Steele was that the federal courts have
jurisdiction in this type of case. The Court's opinion pointed out that section 3, First (i) of the RLA "makes no reference to disputes between
employees and their representatives." Moreover, not only did the evidence show the refusal of the NRAB to entertain complaints by individual members of a craft, but
since § 3, First (c) permits the national labor organizations chosen by
the majority of the crafts to "prescribe the rules under which the labor
members of the Adjustment Board shall be selected" and to "select such
members and designate the division on which each member shall serve," the
Negro fireman would be required to appear before a group which is in large
part chosen by the respondents against whom their real complaint is made."
Finally, section 3, Second permits a carrier and the bargaining representative of a class or craft to agree to the establishment of a regional
board of adjustment to hear disputes otherwise within the jurisdiction of
the NRAB; in this way "the carrier and the representative against whom
the Negro firemen have complained have power to supersede entirely the
Adjustment Board's procedure and to create a tribunal of their own selection to interpret and apply the agreements now complained of to which
they are the only parties."
There being no administrative remedy under the RLA in this type of
case, the courts, "whose jurisdiction and duty to afford a remedy for a
'9323 U.S. at 201-02.
1d. at 204.
51Id. at 204.
52
1d. at 205.
3 Id. at 206.
54Id. at 206.

50

1968 ]

DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

breach of statutory duty are left unaffected," ' must act to protect the
rights of the complainants by the grant of an injunction and award of
damages when appropriate.
In Steele the Court was careful to point out, however, that the statutory
representative of a craft is not barred from making agreements "which
may have unfavorable effects on some of the members of the craft represented."' 6 Variations in contract terms based on differences in seniority,
the type of work performed, and competence were recognized as "within

the scope of the bargaining representation of a craft, all of whose members are not identical in their interest or merit.""
In Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen," a case based on
the same facts as those presented in Steele and in Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen," the Supreme Court made explicit what it had
only implied in the latter decisions, namely, that the Norris-La Guardia
Act did not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction "to compel compliance
with positive mandates of the Railway Labor Act." ' After commenting
that nothing in the RLA suggests that Congress intended to hold out to
Negroes "an illusory right for which it was denying them a remedy,"'"
the Court concluded:
If, in spite of the Virginian,6 Steele, and Tunstall" cases . . . there remains
any illusion that under the Norris-La Guardia Act the federal courts are
powerless to enforce these rights, we dispel it now. The District Court has
jurisdiction to enforce by injunction petitioners' rights to nondiscriminatory
representation by their statutory representative [citations added]."
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard,' decided eight years after
Steele and two years before Brown v. Board of Education," shows how far
the Supreme Court had already moved in its treatment of racial discrimination cases. The plaintiff, a Negro, was employed by the St. Louis-San
Francisco Railway (Frisco) as a "train porter," a classification reserved
for Negroes. He and other Negroes so classified performed, among other
tasks, all the duties of white "brakemen," who were represented by the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (BRT), which admitted no Negroes
to membership. The BRT had, in the Court's words, "for years used its
influence in an attempt to eliminate Negro trainmen and get their jobs
11
Id.
56

at 207.
1d. at 203.
51Id. at 203.
5'338 U.S. 232

(1949).

" 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
6 Id. at 237. See, Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 292, 300-22

(1963).

61338 U.S. at 240.
62 Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300

U.S. 515

(1937),

holding that the Norris-La

Guardia Act does not bar a mandatory federal court injunction to compel a carrier to bargain
collectively.
6 Although this case directly raised the issue of accommodating Norris-La Guardia and the
RLA, the Supreme Court did not pass on the propriety of the injunctive remedy.
64 338 U.S. at 240.
65343 U.S. 768 (1952).
6 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), holding "that in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place."
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for white men," and it "finally forced the Frisco to agree to discharge the
colored 'train porters' and fill their jobs with white men who . . . would
do less work but get more pay."6 Plaintiff brought a class action in federal
court to have the discriminatory agreement between BRT and Frisco declared void and to enjoin Frisco from discontinuing the train porter jobs
and from hiring white brakemen to replace Negro train porters.
The case differed from Steele in that the train porters had for many
years been treated by the carriers and the BRT as a separate class for
representation purposes and had been represented by another union of
their own choosing. BRT argued that because of this circumstance it
"owed no duty at all to refrain from using its statutory bargaining power
so as to abolish the jobs of colored porters and drive them from the railroads."6
A majority of the Court rejected this argument as unsound and concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.
The end result of these transactions [said the Court] is not in doubt; for
precisely the same reason as in the Steele case "discriminations based on race
alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious. Congress plainly did not undertake to authorize the bargaining representative to make such discriminations."
Steele v. L.&N.R. Co.... Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer. . .. "
Of course, BRT was not the bargaining representative of plaintiffs. But
the majority opinion observed: "Bargaining agents who enjoy the advantages of the Railway Labor Act's provisions must execute their trust without lawless invasions of the right of other workers.""
Discrimination dies slowly. Five years later, in Conley v. Gibson,"
Negro employees, in the words of Justice Black, speaking for a unanimous
court, were "again . . . here under the Railway Labor Act asking that
their collective bargaining agent be compelled to represent them fairly." 2
The facts were similar to those in Howard, except that plaintiffs were
represented under the Act by the defendant Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks. Under a collective agreement providing for protection
against discharge and loss of seniority, the carrier, Texas and New Orleans
Railroad, purported to abolish 45 jobs held by Negroes in its Houston
Freight House. Actually, the jobs were not abolished but instead were
filled by white members of the Brotherhood. The discharged Negroes
unsuccessfully sought redress through the Brotherhood, which refused to
give them protection comparable to that given white employees.
U.S. at 770.
6s Id. at 773.
191d. at 773-74. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), held that court enforcement of racially
restricted covenants affecting the ownership and occupancy of real property constituted "state
action" outlawed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 160 P.2d 831
(1946) (exclusive bargaining representative under the RLA was an agency of the Federal Govern67 343

ment and thus restrained by the Fifth Amendment from denying equal representation to a minority
group segregated in a "Jim Crow" auxiliary). But see Davis v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 272
S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (principle of school segregation cases not applicable to "separate
but equal" Negro locals because segregated union members are not "immature children").
70343 U.S. at 774, [Emphasis added.].
7' 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
7
1Id. at 42.
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In holding that petitioners had alleged valid grounds for declaratory
and injunctive relief and for damages over which the federal courts had
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court ruled that the NRAB was without jurisdiction, because the dispute was not between the Brotherhood and the carrier but between employees and their bargaining agent. The carrier was held
not to be an indispensable party, because the Court could not see how its
rights or interests would be affected by the action to enforce the Brotherhood's duty of fair representation. The Court also took occasion to clear
up any misapprehension as to the scope of the duty of fair representation:
The bargaining representative's duty not to draw "irrelevant and invidious"
distinctions among those it represents does not come to an abrupt end, as
the respondents seem to contend, with the making of an agreement between
union and employer. Collective bargaining is a continuing process. Among
other things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and other
working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by existing agreements,
and the protection of employee rights already secured by contract. The bargaining representative can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these
functions than it can in negotiating a collective agreement.73
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the Supreme Court has held
that under the RLA a union owes an affirmative duty of fair representation
to all members of the bargaining unit for which it is the exclusive representative. It may not discriminate against Negroes solely because of their
race, whether or not they belong to the union. The duty applies not only
to the negotiation of new contract terms but also to the application of
terms of existing agreements. Finally, the union owes even to persons outside the bargaining unit represented by the union, who may or may not be
represented by another labor organization, an affirmative duty not to use
its power to cause an employer to discriminate against them solely on
racial grounds.
Two major questions regarding racial discrimination under the Act
have as yet not been disposed of by the Court. The first and more important concerns the union's duty to admit to equal membership all employees
whom it purports to represent. It is now generally agreed that "separate
but equal" is as specious a concept in collective bargaining as it is in
education, and that it is impossible for employees who are denied membership because of their race in a union which represents them for purposes
of collective bargaining to receive treatment equal to that given members
of the union.74 Yet so far, the Supreme Court's only pronouncement on
that subject is the statement in Steele that the RLA "does not deny to...
a bargaining labor organization the. right to determine eligibility to its
membership . . . "" that is, the right to exclude Negroes. And in the more
recent case of Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,"' involv73
74

1d. at 46.

See Aaron & Komaroff, supra note 34, at 436, 673; Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and
Labor Unions, 8 LAB. L.J. 874, 875 (1957).
75 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
7

262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959), "[i]n view of the abstract

context in which the questions sought to be raised are presented by this record."
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ing an action by a group of Negro firemen to compel the BLFE to admit
them to membership, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
denial of relief and refused to accept "the fine-spun hypothesis, which
charges the Congress with federal action of a type proscribed by the Fifth
Amendment."" Inso doing the court of appeals relied on Steele and held
that "decisions of the Supreme Court in the field of administration of
public schooling are not analogous to the instant case." 78 Brown v. Board of
5 and Bowling v. Sharpe," said the court, "were predicated on
Education"
the fact that affirmative legislation of the states and the District of
Columbia, respectively, denied Negroes access to schools supported by
public tax funds." 1
The "fine-spun hypothesis," however, has now achieved the status of
a constitutional principle, and it may be assumed that if the same issue
again reaches the Supreme Court, the claims of the Negro plaintiffs will
be sustained."
The second unresolved question is whether a union may accept a discriminatory provision in a collective agreement at the employer's request,
provided the union did not affirmatively seek such a provision. At least
one authority has argued that the union could do so under such circumstances without violating its duty of fair representation;" but later commentary supports the contrary and better view,8 as does the one decision
by a court of appeals on the point."
The issue will probably arise with decreasing frequency in future,
however, because section 703 (a) (2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"6
makes it an unfair employment practice for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin."
2. Scope of the Duty of Fair Representation
The distinction drawn in the Burley case between negotiating new contracts and settling grievances under an existing agreement is but another
expression of the familiar dichotomy between disputes over interests and
disputes over rights. It is not very satisfactory as an analytical tool, however, because the processes of contract negotiation and of grievance settle" 262 F.2d at 363.
78 Id.
78347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80347 U.S. 497 (1954), holding that racial segregation in the public schools of the District
of Columbia violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
85262 F.2d at 363.
82See M. SOVERN, supra note 45, at 152 n.41, 42.
3
" Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 156 (1957).
84 Eg., Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 563, 578-84 (1962).
"SCentral of Georgia Ry. v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 848
(1956). Cf. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 57 CCH Lab. Cas. 5 9101 (E.D. Va. 1967). But cf.
Hayes v. Union Pac. R.R., 88 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 184 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 942 (1951).
8042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1964).
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ment are frequently indistinguishable. 7 The notion that a union's freedom
of action 'to settle grievances is more circumscribed than its authority to
negotiate new contract terms still has some vitality;"' but in litigation
under the RLA the distinction emphasized in Burly has been relied upon
for somewhat different purposes than Justice Rutledge may have intended.
The lower federal courts have not only stressed the freedom that must be
accorded a union in its exercise of legislative functions, but have also been
reluctant to interfere in disputes challenging its handling of grievances.
Indeed, it may be said that in nonracial unfair representation cases courts
have cited the holding in Burley much less frequently than the dictum in
Steele that the bargaining representative is not barred from making agreements "which may have unfavorable effects on some members of the craft
represented.""9
In cases challenging the union's authority to enter into new contract
terms that adversely affect an employee's previously established seniority
and related rights the courts have generally upheld the union, provided no
racial discrimination was involved."0 The reasoning in some of the cases,
however, is hard to understand. In Colbert v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen the court referred to "the essential difference" between the negotiation of changes in seniority rights and the reliance on "invidious proscriptive factors that are inimical to statutory or constitutional right, such as
racial discriminations."''. "Seniority among railway workers," said the court,
"is fundamentally and wholly contractual and it does not arise from mere
employment and is not an inherent, natural or constitutional right.""
Just why the duty of fair representation should be any less in respect of
rights which, although "wholly contractual," are of vital importance to
the employees involved, is not made clear in the court's opinion."'
In Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs," on the other hand,
7 The great majority of grievances are settled at a stage prior to third-party intervention,
and it would come as a surprise to many employers and unions to be told that the process by
which they reached agreement (with or without the grievants' prior knowledge or consent) was
distinguishable from the process by which they negotiated new contracts. In the railroad industry
the question whether a given controversy is over a grievance ("minor dispute") or a new contract
term ("major dispute") is itself frequently a matter of dispute between the parties. See Aaron,
supra note 60, at 320-21.
"See, e.g.,Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing
denied, 100 N.W.2d 317 (1960).
's323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
9
SE.g., Roberts v. Lehigh & N.E. Ry., 323 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1963); Colbert v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 206 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 931 (1954); Lewellyn v.
Fleming, 154 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 715 (1946); Williams v. Central
of Georgia Ry., 178 F. Supp. 248 (M.D. Ga. 1955); Skinner v. Lynch, 418 P.2d 498 (1966).
91206 F.2d at 13.
92

Id.

" See Cox, supra note 83, at 164: "From a practical standpoint seniority confers a status more

important than a bare contractual undertaking. In practice seniority clauses are usually carried
forward from year to year. Contract and custom create expectations. Expectations create reliance.
It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that in some industries, notably railroads, employees build
their lives upon seniority preferences in bidding for jobs in a defined pool of work. Under these
circumstances it seems highly formal to reason that since the union and company negotiated the
original seniority clause, they can change it at will. When established seniority rights are changed,
the bargaining representative should be required to show some practical justification beyond the
desire of the majority to share the job opportunities theretofore enjoyed by a smaller group."
94 116 F. Supp. 3 (D.C.D.C. 1953).
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the derogation of plaintiffs' seniority rights in favor of union members
from another geographical district was sufficiently egregious to persuade
the court not to dismiss the suit. Instead, it ruled that the case was covered
by the decision in Steele: "Here the discriminations based on prior employment and geography alone are also irrelevant and invidious."'
Poetic justice of a sort was achieved by a federal district court in
Williams v. Central of Georgia Ry.'" Here, as part of its continuing campaign to get rid of Negro firemen, the BLFE had first negotiated an agreement barring Negro firemen from promotion to engineer, and had then
agreed with the carrier that white firemen who refused to take or failed
to pass examinations for promotion to engineer would be restricted to
yard duty. Plaintiffs were white firemen who failed to pass the qualifying
examinations and who then complained that the requirement was discriminatory. In denying relief the court dryly observed:
These agreements provided for all White firemen a package deal which must
be viewed in its entirety. One sailing downstream, thus enjoying the favorable current cannot gracefully complain of the comparatively minor eddies
and whirlpools. 7
Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters" provides one of the
few discussions of the nature of a union's duty of fair representation
under the RLA in the administration of a seniority clause, as opposed to
the negotiation of such a provision. Plaintiff claimed that the union had
first refused to help him process a legitimate grievance based on the seniority provisions in the collective agreement because he was not a member,
and had then induced him to sign a waiver of his rights. In upholding
plaintiff's right to press his suit for damages against the union the court
of appeals said in part:
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly characterized this obligation
[of fair representation] by the very term "fiduciary relationship," its treatment of the subject is tantamount thereto .... While it is not always appropriate to transplant common law concepts to the field of labor relations, it
is plain that in the Supreme Court's view the federal statutory duty of fair
representation is not unlike a common law fiduciary obligation. It would be
anomalous to bar as a matter of law the plaintiff's suit for an alleged breach
of the union's "fiduciary obligation" because, finding himself in economic
straits due to the "fiduciary's" alleged misfeasance, or nonfeasance, he executed
upon its advice a waiver of rights that it should have secured for him."
Judicial decisions in cases involving alleged failure to provide fair repre-

sentation in the negotiation and administration of union security provisions'"' follow much the same pattern manifested in the seniority cases.
" Id. at 8. Accord, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Luckie, 286 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955).
96 178 F. Supp. 248 (M.D. Ga. 1955).

" Id. at 255.
' 316 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1963), decision on remand, 243 F. Supp. 261 (E.D.S.C. 1965),
aff'd, 367 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967).
9"316 F.2d at 201.
"' RLA, § 2, Eleventh (c), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (c), provides in part: "The requirement
of membership in a labor organization [under a valid union security agreement] . . . shall be satisfied,
as to both a present or future employee in engine, train, yard, or hostling service . . . if such
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In Hostetler v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainnmen'" plaintiffs stopped paying dues to the BRT, as required by a union security agreement between
the union and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., and joined the newlyformed Union of Railroad Operating Crafts. Subsequently, however, the
Supreme Court held that the UROC was not "national in scope" and hence
not within the ambit of section 2, Eleventh (c)."2 In 1957 plaintiffs were
discharged at the instance of the BRT for failure to pay the dues required
under the union security agreement. Plaintiffs filed suit against the union,
claiming unfair discrimination because, among other things, the union
cited them to the carrier for discharge while failing to cite other employees
who were delinquent in their dues payments. In affirming the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint the court of appeals stated in part:
[W]e do not think itunlawful . . .for the Brotherhood to cite some employees to the Railroad for failure to maintain membership in a qualified union
more promptly after their default than itcites others. BRT's reason for
this was that, as to some, it had greater hopes of persuading them to rejoin.
This would seem to furnish a reasonable basis for distinctions in treatment
and not to constitute the arbitrary discrimination forbidden by law."°
Stricter enforcement of a union security clause against the plaintiff,
relative to other employees, was sufficient in Cunningham v. Erie R.R.,0 4
however, to support a finding of unfair discrimination and an award of
damages against the union. Plaintiff had refused to pay dues in protest over
an ill-founded but honest grievance regarding his seniority status that
went unheeded by the union. The court found that the union's policy of
expelling employees for delinquency in dues payments was extremely
flexible and that only plaintiff had been expelled for that reason during a
two year period. Unlike the others, plaintiff had flatly refused to pay his
dues before being expelled and then discharged; but the court brushed
this distinction aside, saying:
However, the evidence indicates that his [plaintiff's] refusal was not final
but was based on his preoccupation over his seniority. Plaintiff's schooling
ended in the fourth grade, and he is obviously a man of limited education.
He was confused between the obligation to pay dues and the matter of his
seniority rights, and while his seniority rights do not appear to have been
violated, it is understandable that plaintiff ...thought he had a legitimate
grievance which he wished to have ironed out before he paid his dues. It is
likely that plaintiff's complaints about his seniority rights annoyed officials of
the Union, but this does not provide an adequate basis for treating the plaintiff differently from other members as to payment of dues."'
employee shall hold or acquire membership in any. one of the labor organizations, national in scope,
organized in accordance with this Act and admitting to membership employees of a craft or class
in any of said services; and no agreement . . . shall provide for deductions from his wages for
periodic dues, initiation fees, or assessments payable to any labor organization other than that in
which he holds membership ...
"
'0'287 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 955 (1962).
'0 See text at note 16 supra.
'03287 F.2d at 459.
'04266 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959), decision on remand, 243 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
aff'd,
358 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1966).
1'5243 F. Supp. at 576.
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3. ProceduralBarriersto Court Action
The critical importance of Steele in the contemporary context is its
holding that the federal courts have jurisdiction over disputes between
employees and their bargaining representatives for which there is no
adequate administrative remedy. Some of the earlier decisions following
Steele sought to limit it to racial discrimination cases and continued to
hold that the NRAB was the proper body to resolve claims of nonracial
discrimination.'" The accepted view today, however, is that expressed by
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Thompson v. Brotherhood
of Sleeping Car Porters,"' and supported by "[a]n overwhelming body
of judicial opinion and learned commentary": "The Supreme Court's
adjudications touching this judicially enforceable statutory duty should
be interpreted as also prohibiting invidious discrimination that is not based
upon race." 1"
But the road to the court house is not without some obstructions; procedural barriers impede the way in racial and nonracial cases alike. Some
courts have dismissed suits based on an alleged violation of the duty of
fair representation for failure to set forth sufficient facts to support the
allegations. The "decisive answer" to this argument was stated by the
Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson to be
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out
in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the
Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" 1" that will give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests ....

The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a

game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome
and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits .... 110

A different result may ensue, however, if the suit is brought in a state
court. In McDonald v. Chicago, M., St.P. & Pac. R.R."' the Wisconsin
Supreme Court sustained a demurrer to a complaint that a union failed
negligently or wilfully to represent plaintiff in connection with his discharge because no cause of action had been stated. The complaint, said the
court, failed to "allege the pertinent terms of the union constitution or
other membership contract [or] . . . of the collective . . . agreement."
Without those allegations, it stated "only conclusions of law with respect
to the union's duty to protect plaintiff's rights and its failure to do so. 1 ..
A more serious barrier is the requirement in some jurisdictions that
plaintiff exhaust his internal union appeals, as well as contract griev16See, e.g., Alabaugh v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 222 F.2d 861, 866-67 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 839 (1955); Spires v. Southern Ry., 204 F.2d 453, 456-57 (4th Cir. 1953). Cf. Chapman v. Local 104, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 199 F. Supp. 186, 188-90 (S.D. W.Va. 1961).
107316 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1963).
'°8Id. at 198. Accord, Mount v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Engr's, 226 F.2d 604 (6th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 967 (1956).
'"FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
"a 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
...25 Wis. 2d 205, 130 N.W.2d 794 (1964).
112130 N.W.2d at 800-01.
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ance machinery, before commencing his suit.' The rule seems reasonable
enough, especially when limited by the requirements of section 101 (a) (4)
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which
provides that "[n]o labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court ... Provided, that any such
member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but
not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before
instituting legal ... proceedings . . . . ""
In cases charging racial discrimination, however, the rule loses most of
its cogency. In Neal v. System Board of Adjustment,"' for example, Negro
employees, members of a segregated local of the Railway Clerks, charged
the union with failing to represent them fairly because of their race. The
union's motion for summary judgment was sustained and affirmed on appeal
in part because plaintiffs had not exhausted their internal union remedies.
Relying upon a dictum of,'questionable applicability in Tunstall,'" the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declared: "We therefore adhere
to the firmly established rule that remedies within the union, when available, as here, are to be pursued as a prerequisite to relief in the federal
courts and we indulge in no exception merely because the discrimination
alleged is based on race."'"" Yet it seems obvious that exhaustion of internal
union remedies in this case would have been a useless and time-consuming
gesture.
B. Judicial Enforcement Under The Railway Labor Act: Airlines
In 1936 the RLA was amended to cover common carriers by air."!
Section 202 of the amended Act provides:
The duties, requirements, penalties, benefits, and privileges prescribed and
established by provisions of Title I of this Act [sections 1-12], except the
provisions of section 3 thereof [establishing the NRAB], shall apply to said
carriers by air and their employees in the same manner and to the same extent
as though such carriers and their employees were specifically included within
the definition of "carrier" and "employee," respectively, in section 1 thereof.

Section 205 of the amended Act empowers the NMB to establish a
permanent National Air Transport Adjustment Board, with powers similar
to those of the NRAB, when in its judgment it shall be necessary to do so.
"'Neal v. System Board of Adjustment, 348 F.2d 722 (8th Cit. 1965); Gainey v. Brotherhood
of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 275 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1"960); Martin v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 197 F.
Supp. 188 (W.D. La. 1961); Fagan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 173 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Pa. 1959);
Davis v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 272 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
11429 U.S.C. S 411 (a) (4) (1964). Exhaustion of internal remedies is not an absolute requirement of section 101 (a) (4). The provision has been construed as providing only that "a member
of a-labor union who attempts to institute proceedings before a court or administrative agency may
be required by that court or agency to exhaust internal remedies of less than four months' duration
before invoking outside assistance." Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75,
78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
is 348 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1965).
iB "For the reasons also stated in our opinion in the Steele case the petitioner [Tunstall] is
without available administrative remedies, resort to which, when available, is prerequisite to
equitable relief in the federal courts." 323 U.S. 210, 213-14 (1944).
11734 F.2d 722, 727 (8th Cir. 1965).
11845 U.S.C. 5§ 181-88 (1964).
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The NMB has not established such a board, however, and there seems no
likelihood that it will do so. Instead, "minor" disputes involving airlines
covered by the Act are disposed of through machinery required by section
204 of the amended Act, that is, system, group, or regional boards of
adjustment. These boards typically consist of an equal number of carrier
and employee representatives; neutrals are called in to resolve deadlocks.
Although the airline system boards were conceived of as the mirror
image of their counterparts in the railroad industry, in practice their resemblance to tripartite arbitration boards in other industries is much closer
than to the NRAB or the railroad system boards. Nor do the airline system
boards have the same procedural uniformity that characterizes the older
railroad model; instead, they show more diversity, based on the needs of
the specific carriers and unions that established them.
Airline unions have, of course, the same rights of exclusive representation under the RLA as do the railroad labor organizations; and with those
rights comes the same duty of fair representation. Judging by the number
and types of cases reaching the courts, the airline unions have been somewhat more faithful to this responsibility than have their sister organizations
in the railroad industry.
There are a number of reasons for this. The airline industry is relatively
new; many of the discriminatory practices associated with the railroads
were outlawed by the courts before they could become established in the
air transport business. Unlike the railroad industry, the airlines do not
constitute "a state within a state..". They are much more integrated with
the rest of the economy, and more receptive to ideas based on experiences
in other industries. Also, they employ a more heterogeneous work force
and deal with a wider variety of unions than do the railroads.
We have previously noted the virtually hopeless plight of the individual
grievant who, contrary to the wishes of or in direct opposition to his
union, tries to take his case to the NRAB. His counterpart in the airline
industry is not confronted by that problem. Individual grievants frequently appear before system boards of adjustment and are sometimes
represented by their own attorneys. Nevertheless, there have been a few
reported cases arising out of claims of unfair representation by an airline
union. As might be expected, most of these involve disputes over seniority
rights.
In Edwards v. Capital Airlines, Inc.,' plaintiffs were two pilots who
had first been employed by Capital under a collective agreement between
Capital and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). Plaintiffs were not
members of ALPA. Having been laid off because of curtailment of Capital's operations, both plaintiffs entered the armed services, from which
they were honorably discharged, and both applied to Capital for reemployment soon afterward. The company reinstated them with seniority
dating back in each case to the date of original employment. The other
11 Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A

Unique Administrative Experiment,

46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937).
120 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 885 (1949).
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pilots protested and presented, through ALPA, a group grievance, which
was sustained by a system board of adjustment, consisting of two Capital
representatives and two members of ALPA. Apparently, the services of
a neutral were not required. The board held that the two pilots were not
employees at the time they had entered the armed services and that their
seniority should be established in relation to the date they returned to
Capital. Plaintiffs then took their case to a federal district court, which
dismissed the complaint.
One of the issues considered on appeal was whether the adjustment
board's decision should be held not to bind plaintiffs "because they were
not parties to the proceedings and because there was no provision for a
voice representative of them in the Board's deliberations, i.e., 'at the council
table.' .....
The court found that in each of the three steps of the grievance
procedure before company officials, who decided in favor of plaintiffs,
they had been present and represented by their own attorney. Nevertheless,
at no time had plaintiffs been considered parties to the proceedings.
In the proceedings before the board of adjustment plaintiffs and their
attorney again were present, but formal appearances were entered only by
ALPA and Capital. Plaintiffs' attorney was permitted to examine witnesses,
however, as well as to present evidence. From these facts the court of appeals concluded that plaintiffs had not been denied substantial rights merely
because they had not been considered parties to the proceedings. But the
court was troubled by plaintiffs' further contention "that the award ...
could not be final and binding upon these appellants, because the making
of the award was in the hands of their active adversaries.
,,'2'
After
considerable discussion of this point the court declared:
We are of clear opinion that the award . .. is entitled to presumptive
weight of validity, and he who would upset it must bear a considerable
burden. But it is also clear that the situation presented by the case before us
is potentially extremely dangerous to the rights of the minority nonmembers.
If the union were neutral in the dispute, that would be one thing. But where
the union is aggressively presenting the interests of one group of employees
and the company has no stake in the outcome, impartiality, protective of the
rights of a nonmember minority, could hardly be conclusively presumed.
Nothing in the foregoing leads to a conclusion that the award .
is
invalid per se. And we are not of opinion that it is. But . . .under the
combination of circumstances here present, these appellants have a right to
have a court examine the award and the procedure from which it resulted.2 3
The court then made its own interpretation of the seniority clause
covering plaintiffs' rights at the time of re-employment and remanded the
case for determination whether the award sustained their seniority rights
as determined by the court. If so, the lower court was directed to declare
the award "valid and correct"; otherwise, the award was "to be declared
invalid and the company directed to make the placement accord with
121

176 F.2d at 758.

Id. at 759.
1"Id. at 760-61.
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the views here expressed."' "
Much of the Edwards case is, of course, no longer good law. It is now
firmly established that a suit to enforce an award of a system board of
adjustment voluntarily established under section 204 of the RLA arises
under a federal statute and is governed by federal law.'" Federal law makes
it clear that "[t]he refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration
award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements. The federal policy . . . would be undermined if courts had
the final say on the merits of the awards. . . ." ' Thus, under present law
the court of appeals in Edwards was without authority to substitute its
interpretation of the applicable seniority provision for that of the system
board of adjustment.'"
The court's power to review the procedural fairness of the proceedings
before the system board in Edwards, however, has, as we shall see, been
vindicated in subsequent cases." But what standards should govern? In
Edwards the court strongly implied that if the union had been "neutral"
and the carrier had had "a stake in the outcome," it might not have felt
impelled to intervene. One is constrained to inquire, however, how a union
can ever be "neutral" in a seniority dispute, which almost invariably involves conflicting claims between members of a bargaining unit for which
the union is the exclusive representative. Obviously, there is tension, if
not conflict, between the union's duty of fair representation, owed to all
members of the bargaining unit, and its duty to uphold rights guaranteed
by the collective agreement as interpreted in good faith by the union."'
As for the carrier's presumed disinterestedness in the outcome in Edwards, the court's conclusion was surely naive. It strains credulity to
accept the proposition that Capital was indifferent whether the grievance
of two nonunion employees was sustained and the main body of ALPA
members thereby disaffected. Moreover, the decision of at least one of the
two carrier representatives on' the board of adjustment was required to
form a majority and reverse three lower-level decisions by carrier officials
in plaintiffs' favor.
Even in the typical seniority grievance, in which A and B, both members
of the bargaining unit, are competing for a job vacancy, and the employer
assigns the job to A over the protests of B, whose grievance is presented by
the union, the problem of securing fair representation for A is a difficult
one. Courts will generally assume, as the court in Edwards would surely
have done, that, absent strong evidence to the contrary, the union was
114 Id. at 762.
' International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682

(1963).
.1.United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). The
Court cautioned, however: "Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application
of the collective . . . agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice
. . . [and] his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the . . . agreement."
Id. at 597.
"" Dominguez v. National Airlines, Inc., 57 CCH Lab. Cas. 5 12479 (S.D.N.Y.. 1968).
5
'" See especially the discussion of Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), infra note 162;
and Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), infra note 177.
"'9Aaron, supra note 25.
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acting in good faith and that A's interests were adequately protected by

the employer.13 ° In this type of case, however, B is almost always present
at the arbitration hearing and A is almost never there. The employer will
presumably defend its assignment of the job to A, but it may not be able
or willing effectively to support A's contention that the union is supporting B because he is a union member, whereas A is not. Thus, the arbitrator
may decide in B's favor without ever having been apprised of the union's
alleged unfair representation; nor is it likely that such a charge would
subsequently be considered by a court in an action to vacate the award.
Several cases involving charges of unfair representation in determining
seniority rights have grown out of mergers, such as that between Capital

and United Air Lines, and have been further complicated by jurisdictional
rivalry between ALPA and the Flight Engineers International Association
(FEIA) over representation of the "third man" in the cockpit. In Oling
v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n1 ' former members and officers of FEIA complained
without success to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) that in merging
the seniority lists of the surviving carrier (United), ALPA, which had
won exclusive bargaining rights for all flight deck personnel on United,"'2
had not accorded them fair treatment. Instead of appealing the order of
the CAB dismissing their petition, 3' plaintiffs brought a collateral action
against ALPA and United in the federal district court, which dismissed
their suit. In affirming, however, the court of appeals refrained from deciding whether the CAB had exclusive, or only concurrent, jurisdiction
over plaintiffs' initial claim that the merged seniority lists discriminated
unfairly against them.
In Hyland v. United Air Lines, Inc.,' another group of United employees, who had formerly served as flight engineers and who complained
of the same discrimination as that alleged in Oling, directed their protest
to a system board of adjustment instead of to the CAB. Losing before
the system board, they then filed suit in federal district court. This time
the court held that because the CAB had approved the Capital-United
merger subject to the inclusion of specified protective labor clauses, including one relating to the merger of seniority lists," it had exclusive jurisdiction over the charge that ALPA had discriminated unfairly against
plaintiffs. "The parties affected by the CAB merger order," said the court,
"cannot be required to answer in different forums at different times on
1
different charges for actions taken under the CAB merger umbrella.""
'
By way of dictum, the court added that the record disclosed no evidence
130But
see Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing
denied, 100 N.W.2d 317 (1960).
13 346 F.2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965).
112 For the background of this development see UNA Chap., Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n v. NMB,
294 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962).
132The Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1964), provides for judicial review of CAB
orders by the appropriate court of appeals.
s4254 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill.1966).
1reUnited Capital Merger, 33 C.A.B. 307, 342 (1961).
1s6254 F. Supp. at 372. Cf. Holman v. Southern Airways, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Ga.

1962).
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of bad faith or of failure to provide fair representation.
The one discharge case involving charges of hostile discrimination by
the union that deserves mention here is Brady v. Trans World Airways,
Inc.' This case may usefully be compared with Thompson v. Brotherhood
of Sleeping Car Porters.'a Mr. Brady himself reminds one of the redoubtable Colonel Dawkins, celebrated in Professor Chafee's classic essay. '
Brady's long fight with TWA and the International Association of Machinists (IAM) began in 1956, when he was discharged under a union security
clause for failure to pay back dues and a reinstatement fee. His initial
refusal was based on the belief that the dues had been illegally increased.
A system board of adjustment subsequently sustained the dismissal.
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration by the system board, Brady
brought suit in 1957 in a Delaware federal district court for reinstatement and damages. Between that date and 1965 he waged his legal battle
unceasingly; six separate opinions were eventually handed down by the
district court in the one case. 4' Unfortunately for the development of the
law relating to the union's duty of fair representation, the definitive ruling,
which upheld Brady's claim for reinstatement and damages against both
TWA and IAM, was based on an interpretation of the union security
provisions of the RLA; the court did not find it necessary to rule on Brady's
charge that the union had failed to represent him fairly. On the question of
damages, the court, relying on the NLRA analogy, awarded only back pay
in addition to reinstatement. It explicitly rejected the irrepressible Brady's
demands for "damages for mental suffering arising from the humiliation
and embarrassment caused . . .by his illegal discharge, damage to reputation, unforseen expenses and punitive damages assessable against defendant
IAM for willful and deliberate acts of discrimination;" as well as his attempt to "join his wife as an additional party plaintiff claiming damages for
loss of consortium.''
C. JudicialEnforcement Under The Labor Management Relations Act
1. Racial Discrimination under the NLRA
As previously indicated," the NLRB decided for the first time in a
series of cases beginning in 1962 that unfair, irrelevant, or invidious treatment of employees by their exclusive bargaining representative violates
rights guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA and constitutes an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of sections 8 (b) (1) (A), 8 (b) (2),
137223 F. Supp.

361

(D. Del. 1963).

'3'See text at note 98 supra.
"'Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1930).
(D. Del. 1957) (allowing plaintiff opportunity to choose either system
board or district court as forum for determination of his rights); 167 F. Supp. 469 (D. Del. 1958)
(permitting plaintiff to amend complaint in nondiversity case so as to bring action within court's
jurisdiction); 174 F. Supp. 360 (D. Del. 1959) (holding amended complaint stated cause of action
within court's jurisdiction); 196 F. Supp. 504 (D. Del. 1961) (denying plaintiff's demand for
punitive damages and for jury trial); 223 F. Supp. 361 (D. Del. 1963) (holding that plaintiff was
unjustly discharged and that TWA and IAM were jointly liable); 244 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del.
1965) (awarding plaintiff reinstatement and back pay).
140156 F. Supp. 82

...
244 F. Supp. at 822.

" See text at notes 39-43, supra.
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and 8 (b) (3) of the Act. Although this construction is obviously broad
enough to cover unfair and discriminatory activity of all kinds, its most
obvious and immediate impact has been in cases involving racial discrimination.
The Board's leading decision in Miranda was given fairly rough treatment by a majority of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
According to.Judge Medina, who spoke for the court, "the single narrow
question of law in the case boils down to whether it was the intent of the
Congress to read into Section 7 and Section 8 the duty of fair representation implicit in Section 9." "45 Relying heavily on the court's decision in
the earlier case of NLRB v. Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,'" he dismissed the Board's theory, as "ingenious, but ...wholly erroneous. ......
This conclusion, he declared,
is . . .the only one consistent with the fundamental scheme of the Unfair
Labor Practices portion of the ... Act. This basic purpose . . .relates to the

interrelationship between employers and labor organizations on the one hand,
and [that] . . . between labor organizations and union and nonunion employees, on the other, all in a perfectly plain context of the effect of such
interrelationships . . . on unions and on union membership. The machinery

of the Board and the remedies applied in the enforcement of findings of
unfair labor practices . . . are not suited to the task of deciding general
questions of private wrongs, unrelated to union activities, suffered by em-

ployers or labor unions.'"
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, was more sympathetic to the Board's arguments. In Local 12, United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB,"' that court unanimously sustained a Board finding that by refusing to process grievances by Negro employees concerning back wages and
segregated plant facilities, the union had restrained or coerced complainants
in their section 7 right to be represented without invidious discrimination;
caused or attempted to cause the employer (Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company of East Gadsden, Alabama) to discriminate against complainants; and refused to bargain in complainants' behalf, thus violating sec143326 F.2d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 1963).
1' 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963) (union did not engage in unlawful coercion of discrimination

by persuading employer to discharge truck driver for reasons not related to union membership).
'45 326

F.2d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 1963).

146id. at 180. Chief Judge Lumbard, relying on the decision in Local 294, Teamsters, note 144

supra, concurred in the decision that the union and employer activities in Miranda had not violated
§§ 8(a) (3) or 8(b) (2). He saw no reason, however, "for the court even to consider the important and far-reaching question . ..whether action which violates
a union's duty of fairrepresentation may constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8 (b) (1)." Id. at 180.
Judge Friendly, dissenting, would have sustained the Board's finding against the union under
§ 8(b) (2) and against the employer under § 8(a) (3). He therefore did not consider the Board's
alternative ground of a decision based on §§ 8(a) (1) and 8(b) (1) (A). He pointed out that the
prohibitory language in §§ 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) does not speak of discrimination " 'in regard to
hire or tenure of employment because of membership in any labor organization'. ...
Neither did
it define the unfair labor practice as being discrimination 'in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.' What Congress forbade was 'to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization' by 'discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment.' " Id. at 181. Judge Friendly therefore considered the decisive question to be whether the
Board could properly find that employees would be induced to conform strictly to union rules
when confronted by evidence of arbitrary treatment of one of them by their employer at the union's
insistence. He concluded that it could. See M. SOvERN, supra note 45, at 168.
"4"368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
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tions 8(b) (1)(A), 8(b) (2), and 8(b) (3) of the Act. The court saw
the "vital issue" as being
that of determining at what point the exclusive bargaining agent's duty to
represent fairly the interests of each individual employee must bow to the
equally comprehensive obligation of negotiating and administering the bargaining contract in accordance with the act's primary policy of fostering
union-employer relations.'"
Expressly disagreeing with the decision of the Second Circuit in Miranda,
the court endorsed the Board's arguments that the duty of fair representation is implicit in the exclusive-representation requirement in section 9 (a)
and is thus an indispensable element of the employees' right "to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing," as guaranteed
by section 7 of the Act, and that in refusing to represent some employees
in the bargaining unit in a fair and impartial manner the union violated
section 8 (b) (1) (A). In this connection the court pointed out that, unlike sections 8 (b) (2) and 8 (a) (3), section 8 (b) (1) (A) is not restricted
to discrimination that encourages or discourages union membership. Noting
that "it is only through the day-to-day administration of individual grievances that employee rights achieved in the negotiated bargaining contract
are placed in a definitive context, and through which specific individual
claims find a vital means of protection," the court declared that to protect
section 7 rights only in those cases involving union conduct encouraging
or discouraging union membership "would to a large degree render such
right[s] meaningless in the area of union administration of the bargaining
agreement. ' "
Approximately one month later, in NLRB v. Local 13 67, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,"' a different panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed, per
curiam, on the authority of the Local 12 case, a Board finding that by
negotiating and maintaining collective agreements providing for segregation of work on the basis of color and by imposing a trusteeship on a segregated local whose members had filed unfair labor practice charges against
racial segregation and discrimination, the union had violated sections
8(b) (1) (A), 8(b) (2), and 8(b) (3) of the Act. One member of the
court concurred solely because of the union's "clear failure to represent
one segment of its members properly." He added the warning, however,
"that here the Board is treading perilous waters by taking over the duties
of unions. By far, the preferable procedure is to let individuals take ordinary steps, such as filing suit, to adjust such grievances......
These misgivings were doubtless prompted by language in the opinion
in the Local 12 case suggesting approvingly that "where the aggrieved employee's claim is not founded on a breach of the bargaining contract, but
rather is based squarely upon an alleged violation of the union's duty of
fair representation . . .the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board
14S
49

id.

at 16.

1 Id. at 20-21.
1"368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).

11id. at 1010.
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'52
will apparently be exclusive, totally preempting that of the courts.'
We shall return to this question in a later section of this article.
The claims adjudicated in the Local 12 case arose long before the effective date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Nevertheless, the
court of appeals concluded that even if the claims had arisen after the
effective date of Title VII, "the complainants under our holding today
would be at liberty to seek redress under the enforcement provisions of
4
Title VII or to assert unfair labor practice charges before the Board."""
The court's purpose here, of course, was to preserve the Board's jurisdiction
to provide protection against all forms of arbitrary union conduct affecting section 7 rights of employees, including that not reached by Title VII.
Its reasoning is broad enough, however, to support the argument that
almost any type of union conduct affecting an employee that is proscribed
by Title VII will also provide the basis of an unfair labor practice charge
against the union under the NLRA."55
The implications of the Local 12 decision, so far as NLRB jurisdiction
over charges of union failure to represent fairly is concerned, extend beyond the limits of this article. In any event, until the Supreme Court has
ruled directly on the point, -discussion of the Board's jurisdiction in this
area must necessarily be speculative in character. Meanwhile, it is apparent
that the Board has embarked upon a course from which it will be diverted
only by an act of Congress, a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court,
'
or a shift in the balance of views within the Board itself. "
Although it may be conceded that the legislative history of sections 7,
8, and 9 of the NLRA tends to support the minority views of Chairman
McCulloch and Member Fanning in the fair representation cases, the majority position, if enforced by the courts, will provide victims of union
racial discrimination with their first reasonably prompt and effective
remedy. 5' Feelings of satisfaction over this development are bound to be
152368 F.2d 12, 22.
15342 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-15

(1964). Section 703(c) makes it an unlawful employment
practice for a labor organization to exclude or expel from membership, or otherwise discriminate
against, any person because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; to limit, segregate,
or classify its membership, or refuse to refer for employment any person, in any way tending to
deprive him of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely to affect his status as an employee
or as an applicant for employment, for any of the proscribed reasons; or to cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against any person in violation of this section. See generally, M.
SOVERN, supra note 45, ch. 4; Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62 (1964); Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representation and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1965).
'54368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th Cir. 1966).
155But cf. Sherman, supra note 153. at 815-20.
'5eIn Miranda the Board divided three to two, Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning dissenting. Of the majority in that case, only Member Brown remains; Members Jenkins and Zagoria
did not participate in Miranda, and Member Zagoria did not participate in Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool); Local 12, United Rubber Workers; or Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n.
157Enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is, of course, an historic event of
incalculable importance; but it cannot be denied that this law fails to provide prompt and effective
relief in many cases over which the NLRB now appears to have concurrent jurisdiction and in
which the complainant can obtain from the Board at least limited relief, including reinstatement
and back pay, more quickly and cheaply than he can under the provisions of the Civil Rights
Act. For a defense of the procedures of Title VII, particularly of the individual's right to litigate
(denied under the NLRA), see Blumrosen, The Individual Right to Eliminate Employment Discrimination by Litigation, 19 IND. REL. RESEARcH Ass'N PROCEEDINGS 88 (1966).
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tempered, however, by the vision of a greatly enlarged Board jurisdiction,
encompassing every type of alleged union discrimination against members
and nonmembers whom it represents. It is at least arguable whether
the Board is the best qualified body to assume that responsibility and
whether, as a practical matter, it could efficiently handle the vastly increased case load that would result from this development.
2. Contract Violations Under Section 301
Well before the Supreme Court decided, in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills,"' that section 301 of the LMRA contemplated the establishment of a federal substantive law governing the enforcement of collective agreements, the Court had developed a substantial body of law
relating to the union's duty of fair representation. The precedents were
not confined to the cases involving racial discrimination previously discussed; nor did they all emphasize the limitations of union authority.
Indeed, the leading case of Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman"' served to legitimate the use of union authority to make decisions detrimental to the interests of some of those whom it represents, so long as it does so in good faith.
At issue in Huffman was the propriety of a negotiated change in a
seniority provision granting credit for military service prior to employment under the agreement and thereby giving some new employees more
seniority than others with longer service in the bargaining unit. In unanimously upholding the union's right to negotiate the change, the Court said
in part:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of
any negotiation agreement affect individual employees. The mere existence of
such differences does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of
all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the
exercise of its discretion.!"0
This standard has subsequently been applied by the lower federal courts
to the union's administration as well as its negotiation of collective agree16
ments. '
The most significant recent developments of the law have come in
cases arising under section 301. In Humphrey v. Moore' the Supreme
Court held that an employee may sue his union under section 301 for
violation of his contractual rights. The case arose out of the amalgamation
of two companies whose employees were represented by the same union.
Plaintiffs filed a class action in a state court for injunctive relief against
implementation of the decision of a union-employer grievance committee,
158353

U.S. 448

(1957).

'59345 U.S. 330 (1953).

"'0 Id. at 338.
161 E.g., Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), aff'd per curiam,
273 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1960); Hildreth v. Union News, 315 F.2d 548 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 826 (1963).
162375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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made pursuant to contractual procedure, which merged the employees'
seniority rankings following the amalgamation. They claimed to have
been deprived of their seniority rights and threatened with loss of employment. Plaintiffs alleged, first, that the union-employer committee had
exceeded its powers under the collective agreement and, second, that the
committee's decision was brought about by dishonest union conduct in
breach of its duty of fair representation.
The Court was unanimous in ruling against plaintiffs on the merits. It
reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Huffman, and added: "Conflict
between employees represented by the same union is a recurring fact. To
remove or gag the union in these cases would surely weaken the collective
bargaining and grievance processes. '
Of far greater importance, however, was the division in the Court over
the theory on which plaintiffs' action was predicated. The Court had
earlier held in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n'" that a suit for breach of
contract may be brought under section 301, even though the act complained of is arguably or admittedly an unfair labor practice. A majority
of the Court in Humphrey joined in the opinion written by Justice White
holding that both claims relied upon by plaintiffs stated a cause of action
under section 301. The majority's position on the first claim was best
stated, perhaps, in the separate concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Harlan:
[A] committee with authority to settle grievances whose composition is
different from that in the multiunion-multiemployer bargaining unit cannot
be deemed to possess power to effect changes in the bargaining agreement.
When it is alleged that the union itself has engaged or acquiesced in such a
departure from the collective bargaining agreement, I can see no reason why
an individual affected employee may not step into the shoes of the union and
maintain a § 301 suit himself.'"
In adopting the premise of the second claim that the union's failure to
represent fairly constitutes a cause of action based on a breach of contract, even in the absence of any provision in the collective agreement
requiring the union to represent its members fairly, the majority seemed
to enunciate a new principle: the duty of fair representation may be inferred where it is not explicitly set forth.
Justice Goldberg, speaking for himself and.Justice Brennan in an opinion
concurred in by Justice Douglas, rejected the view that plaintiffs had
stated a cause of action arising under section 301. He argued that the
claim "must be treated as an individual employee's action for a breach of
duty of fair representation-a duty derived not from the collective bargaining contract but from the National Labor Relations Act ...
,,66
Considering the first claim that the employer and union had reached a
settlement which violated the collective agreement, Justice Goldberg assert163Id. at 349-50.
164 371 U.S. 195

(1962). This case did not, however, involve any claim that the union had
violated its duty of fair representation.
165375 U.S. at 359.
166Id. at 351.
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ed that whereas "the existing labor contract is the touchstone of an arbitrator's powers," the parties "are free by joint action to modify, amend and
supplement their original collective bargaining agreement.' '.. Because
"[t]here are too many unforeseeable contingencies in a collective bargaining relationship to justify making the words of the contract the exclusive
source of rights and duties," he maintained that it was wholly inconsistent
with the Court's declaration in a previous case that "[t]he grievance procedure is . . . a part of the continuous collective bargaining process""' to
hold "that an individual employee can claim that the collective bargaining
contract is violated because the parties have made a grievance settlement
going beyond the strict terms of the existing contract.''
Turning to the second claim that the decision of the joint committee
was brought about by dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty of
fair representation, Justice Goldberg contended that such a claim could
not properly be made the basis of an action for breach of contract under
section 301, particularly when no fraud had been attributed to the employer:
Where the alleged breach of a union's duty involves a differentiation based on
a relevant classification . .. and where the employer has not willfully participated in the alleged breach of the union's duty, the collective .

.

. agree-

ment should not be open to the collateral attack of an individual employee
merely because the union alone has failed in its duty of fair representation.! 0

To permit such a collateral attack would simply "penalize the honest
employer and encourage groundless charges frustrating joint grievance
settlements.''
How, then, should employees obtain redress in this situation if the
union has in fact breached its duty of fair representation? Justice Goldberg
would confine them to an action against the union (unless the employer
were also implicated) for violation of its duty of fair representation-"a
duty derived not from the collective bargaining contract but implied from
the union's rights and responsibilities conferred by federal labor statutes.'"'
What Justice Goldberg did not say, however, was whether the violation
by the union of this duty was cognizable by the courts or was exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.'
By holding that the action arose under section 301, the Court avoided
that issue; for even if the union's violation of its duty of fair representation
constituted an unfair labor practice-a question the majority did not reach
6

1"Id. at 353.
161 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
169375 U.S. at 355.
0
17 1d. at 357.
171Id. at 358.

" id. at 356.

'73 In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959), the Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter said: "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7
or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence
of the . . . Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." The
extent to which the Court subsequently departed from strict adherence to that principle is analyzed
in Professor Sovern's excellent article, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB,
76 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1963).
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-the courts would have concurrent jurisdiction under the doctrine of
Smith v. Evening News Assn. Deeming this an important issue, Justice
Harlan dissented on the fair representation issue on the ground that it
should have been set for reargument, with the NLRB being invited to
present its views on the matter of preemption.
From both an analytical and a practical point of view, Justice Goldberg
made the most persuasive argument in Humphrey. Seniority rights are
created by contract; neither by law nor by custom have they become an
inherent element of the employment relation. " A union with power to
negotiate such rights should have the power to alter them in a situation,
such as in Humphrey, in which some adjustments were unavoidable.'
And in exercising that authority the union should be able, if necessary,
lawfully to agree with the other party to an existing agreement to modify
both the substance and procedures of that agreement.'
But this extensive authority is always subject, as the Supreme Court has
said, to the requirement of complete good faith and honesty of purpose on
the part of the union. Clearly, aggrieved employees should have the right
to challenge the union's good faith and honesty of purpose in some forum.
For the reasons so forcefully advanced by Justice Goldberg, however, it
strains the meaning of section 301, to say nothing of the harm done to
normal collective bargaining relations, to permit that challenge to be cast
in the form of a suit for breach of contract. It remains to be seen whether,
and to what extent, the Supreme Court will continue to rely upon the
theories enunciated by the majority in Humphrey, or whether the, Court
will in future cases distinguish Humphrey on the facts and hold that the
union's breach of its duty of fair representation does not constitute a
breach of contract under section 301 unless joined in by the employer.
3. Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation and the Primary Jurisdiction
of the NLRB.
In the Local 12 case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, having
decided that the union's violations of its duty of fair representation were
unfair labor practices under the NLRA, and relying upon Garmon, con' See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 1532 (1962).
" The case is a good example of the difficulty of determining whether the dispute was over

"rights" or "interests." The applicable argument provided merely that if the employer absorbed
the business of another carrier or was party to a merger of lines, "the seniority of the employees
absorbed or effected thereby shall be determined by mutual agreement between the Employer and
the Unions involved," 375 U.S. at 338. Unresolved disputes arising out of such a situation were
to be resolved by the Automobile Transporters Joint Conference Committee. In the nature of
things the Joint Conference Committee's functions must have been understood to be "legislative"
as well as "judicial." At the same time, given the fundamental importance of the rights or interests
at stake, the union would seem to have been under a duty to have listened to the views of the rival
groups which it represented and to disclose to them what position it intended to take before the
Joint Conference Committee. Cf. Cox, supra note 93. However, the majority of the Court did not
address itself to the aspect of the duty of fair representation.
176See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1956). For differing
approaches see Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 1435
(1963); Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. REV. 373
(1965); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv.
362 (1962); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958).
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cluded further that this conduct was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB. However, even disregarding the erosion of the Garmon doctrine
in breach of contract cases such as Evening News, it is doubtful that the
court took sufficient account of the traditional reluctance of the Supreme
Court to deny victims of union racial discrimination access to the courts
for relief. Moreover, it could reasonably have been inferred from Justice
Goldberg's silence on the preemption issue in Humphrey that he and the
two justices who joined with him believed suits involving unfair representation are maintainable in the courts.
Speculation on this point ended, however, when the Court handed down
its decision in Vaca v. Sipes."' The suit was initiated 's by an employee
and union member who was dismissed from his job at a Kansas City meat
packing plant because of high blood pressure. He obtained medical evidence
of his fitness to work and secured the union's assistance in attempting to
regain his job. The union unsuccessfully appealed the grievance to each
successive step of the contract grievance procedure, but refused to carry
it to arbitration after receiving an unfavorable report from another doctor
selected by the employee. The employee then filed suit against the union
in a state court, alleging that he had been wrongfully discharged and that
the union, by refusing to take his grievance to arbitration, had violated
its duty of fair representation.
A jury awarded plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages, but
the trial judge granted the union's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on the ground that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction. The
court of appeals affirmed,"" but the Missouri Supreme Court reinstated
the jury's verdict. '" The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the NLRB does not have exclusive jurisdiction but that the Missouri
courts failed to apply the proper federal standard in determining whether
the union had violated its duty of fair representation.'
The unusual breadth of the majority opinion suggests that it wished to
settle a variety of problems connected with employee remedies for union
breach of the duty of fair representation, including some not raised by
this case. In holding that judicial enforcement of the duty was not preempted the opinion noted first that the preemption doctrine "has never
been rigidly applied to cases where it could not fairly be inferred that
Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie with the NLRB, ' " as in
actions for breach of contract under section 301."' Thus, "the decision to
'7386 U.S. 171 (1967). See Note, The Employee's Remedy for a Union Breach of the Duty
of Fair Representation, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1351 (1967).
178 The plaintiff, Benjamin Owens, died before the case reached the Missouri Supreme Court,

and his administrator, Niles Sipes, continued the litigation for the estate.
179Owens v. Vaca, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 5 19613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
80
' Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965). The Missouri Supreme Court held that Owens'
suit was a purely internal union matter, not subject to preemption by the NLRB.
181 The Court split three ways: Justice White wrote for the majority; Justice Fortas, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justice Harlan, concurred in the result on the ground that the matter lay
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB; and Justice Black dissented.
182 386 U.S. at 179.
"sOther examples cited by the majority were § 303 of the LMRA, expressly permitting anyone
injured by a violation of 5 8 (b) (4) of the NLRA to recover damages in a federal court even though
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preempt federal and state court jurisdiction over a given class of cases must
depend upon the nature of the particular interests being asserted and the
effect upon the administration of national labor policies of concurrent
judicial and administrative remedies."'' Applying these criteria to cases
involving alleged violations of the union's duty of fair representation, the
majority concluded that the preemption doctrine was not properly applicable to them."
The majority then turned to a detailed consideration of the problems of
the individual employee who complains of unfair treatment by his employer, the union, or both. It reiterated the principle announced in Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox"s' that an employee must at least attempt to exhaust
exclusive contractual grievance and arbitration procedures before bringing
an action under section 301. The majority recognized, however, that
"because these contractual remedies have been devised and are often controlled by the union and the employer, they may well prove unsatisfactory
or unworkable for the individual grievant.'... It sought, therefore, to
outline the procedures available to him, using as an example the hypothetical case of an employee discharged without good cause in violation of
a collective agreement.
The discharged employee is relieved of the exhaustion requirement, the
majority reasoned, if the employer's conduct "amounts to a repudiation of
those contractual procedures";... or if (as was true in Vaca v. Sipes) "the
union has sole power under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the
grievance procedure, and if ... the employee-plaintiff has been prevented
from exhausting his contractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal
to process the grievance." ' True, in such a situation the employer has
done nothing to prevent the employee's exhaustion of his exclusive contractual remedies, but he has violated the agreement by discharging the
employee without good cause. Thus, the majority concluded:
We cannot believe that Congress, in conferring upon employers and unions
the power to establish exclusive grievance procedures, intended to confer upon
such unfair labor practices are also remediable by the NLRB; and § 14 of the NLRA, as amended,
permitting state agencies and courts to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes as to which the
NLRB has declined to exercise jurisdiction.
184 386 U.S. at 180.
gs The reasons given by the majority were (1) that the doctrine of the duty of fair representation was conceived and developed by the federal courts, and suits alleging breach of the duty
remained judicially cognizable even after the NLRB acquired jurisdiction over union unfair labor
practices; (2) that when the Board finally decided that union violations of the duty were unfair
labor practices, it applied the doctrine as it had been developed by the federal courts; (3) that
the Board's expertise in this area is not substantially greater than that of the courts; (4) that
preemption would create the possibility that an employee injured by arbitrary or discriminatory
union conduct might not receive an impartial review of his complaint because of the unreviewable
discretion of the Board's General Counsel not to issue an unfair labor practice complaint if he
thought the injury complained of was "insubstantial"; and (5) that in many instances whether
a union has violated its duty of fair representation will be a critical issue in an action under § 301
against the employer for breach of contract-an action over which the courts have jurisdiction
even though the breach of contract may also constitute an unfair labor practice.
186379 U.S. 650 (1965).
1'8386 U.S. at 185.
'" Id. at 185, citing Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254
(1962).
"s9386 U.S. at 185.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 34

unions such unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all remedies
for breach of contract. Nor do we think that Congress intended to shield
employers from the natural consequences of their breaches of bargaining
agreements by wrongful union conduct in the enforcement of such agreements.'"
It followed, therefore, that a wrongfully discharged employee may sue
his employer without exhausting his contract remedies, provided he can
prove that the union violated its duty to represent him fairly in the
handling of his grievance. This is true even if it be assumed, as the majority did, that the union's breach of its duty is an unfair labor practice;
the employee's suit against the employer remains a section 301 suit. Nor
is the situation changed if the employee joins the union as defendant or,
as in Vaca v. Sipes, sues the union and employer in separate actions.
The problem of determining appropriate damages in such a suit or suits
was another reason, in the opinion of the Court majority, for not applying the preemption doctrine in these cases. It argued that in situations in
which the union's failure to represent fairly has enhanced or contributed
to the employee's injury, there would be no sense in preventing the court
from awarding damages against the union as well as the employer. If the
NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over such a case, it would be "compelled
in many cases either to remedy injuries arising out of a breach of contract, a task which Congress has not assigned to it, or to leave the individual employee without remedy for the union's wrong.''.
Returning from this discursion to an issue actually raised by the case
before it, the majority concluded that the jury's award against the union
could not be permitted to stand. The test required by federal law, according to the majority, was not the objective fact of Owens' ability or inability to work; rather, it was whether the union's refusal to process his
grievances was arbitrary or in bad faith. Considering the evidence, the
majority held that the union had not acted arbitrarily or in bad faith.
In reaching this conclusion the majority considered and expressly rejected the theory that every employee should have the right to have his
grievance taken to arbitration.' It reasoned that adoption of this principle
would substantially undermine the collective bargaining relation between
union and employer; for it would destroy the employer's confidence in
the union's authority, return the individual grievant "to the vagaries of
independent and unsystematic negotiation, ' and very likely overburden
the arbitration process to the point of rendering it inoperable.
Although there was obviously no occasion to do so, the majority went
on to consider the question of assessment of damages on the assumption
that the union had breached its duty of fair representation.'" It declared
l°Id. at 186.
191 Id. at 187-88.
"' See Donnelly v. United Fruit Co.,
176; Summers, supra note 176.
'386 U.S. at 191.
"' The union had urged that even if
tion, the appropriate remedy would not
to arbitrate the grievance. The majority

40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963); Murphy, supra note

it were found to have violated its duty of fair representabe damages, but a decree compelling it and the employer
agreed that an order compelling arbitration is"one of the
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that the jury's award of punitive damages against the union could not have
been sustained in any case, because it assessed against the union damages
attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract. The correct approach in these cases, said the majority, is to charge the union only for
increases, if any, in the employer's damages caused by the union's wrongful
conduct.
In a separate concurring opinion Justice Fortas, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Harlan, contended that an employee's complaint that
the union had breached its duty of fair representation is an unfair labor
practice charge subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The
concurring justices took the majority to task for its extended discussion
of irrelevant problems. They asserted that the majority was "attempting to
force into the posture of a contract violation an alleged default of the
union which is not a violation of the collective bargaining agreement but
a breach of its separate and basic duty fairly to represent all employees in
the unit. '' "n
In a biting dissent, Justice Black attacked the Court's opinion, concentrating, however, on the dicta rather than on the decision. He professed
to have no quarrel with a narrow holding that "in this situation the employee could not recover damages from the union unless the union breached
its duty of fair representation [and] . . .that the union did not do so in
making a good-faith decision not to take the employee's grievance to
arbitration."'" His principal objection was to the limitations placed by the
majority on the employee's right to sue his employer. As Justice Black
saw the problem, either the union must be compelled to take any arguably
valid grievance to arbitration under the collective agreement or the grievant must be allowed to sue the employer for breach of contract without
the added necessity of proving a violation by the union of its duty of fair
representation. The grievance would thus be decided on its merits by either
an arbitrator or by a jury.
Under the Court's decision, he pointed out, the grievance would probably
reach neither an arbitrator nor a jury. In effect, he concluded, the decision
converts what would otherwise be a simple breach-of-contract action into
a three-ring donnybrook ....[W]hile giving the worker an ephemeral right
to sue his union for breach of its duty of fair representation, [the decision]
creates insurmountable obstacles to block his far more valuable right to sue
his employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 97
It is doubtful whether, for all its good intentions, the Court's opinion
in Vaca v. Sipes contributed anything very constructive to the analysis
available remedies when a breach of the union's duty is proved"; but it saw no reason "inflexibly
to require arbitration in all cases," partly because the arbitrator might not be empowered to award
damages. And in some cases "the arbitrable issues may be substantially resolved in the course of
trying the fair representation controversy, in which event "the court should be free to decide the
contractual claim and to award the employee appropriate damages or equitable relief." 386 U.S.
at 196.
'95386 U.S. at 201-02.
1"7 Id. at 207-08.
'. 1d. at 210.
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of problems faced by an employee claiming violation by the union of its
duty of fair representation. It appears to have adopted the view of Professor Cox that
the interests of the individual will be better protected on the whole by first
according legal recognition to the group interest in contract administration
and then strengthening the representatives' awareness of its moral and legal
obligations to represent all employees fairly than by excluding the union in
favor of an individual cause of action.'98
Certainly, it has rejected the thesis that the individual employee has a
vested right to use the grievance and arbitration procedure of the collective agreement,"' as well as the suggestion that the individual employee
should be permitted to compel the union to process meritorious grievances
involving the "critical job interests" of discharge, compensation, and
seniority."
The Court has definitely adopted the good faith test as the sole basis for
determining whether the union has met its duty to represent all bargaining-unit employees fairly, not only in negotiating new contract terms, as
in Huffman, but also in administering an existing agreement. Given the
Court's acceptance, as expressed in Huffman of the idea that a "wide range
of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative
in serving the unit it represents,"' ' 1 we have, in effect, a presumption of
regularity of union conduct that is not easily rebuttable. Except in cases
of flagrant discrimination, such as those based on racial hostility, it is not
likely, therefore, that plaintiffs alleging union violation of the duty to
represent fairly will meet with much success in the courts.
This lends added significance to the apparent readiness of a majority of
the Court, when squarely faced with the issue, to hold that violations of
the union's duty of fair representation are unfair labor practices cognizable
by the NLRB, even if not within its exclusive jurisdiction. Although the
majority in Vaca v. Sipes emphasized the inadequacies of relief available
to the aggrieved employee in a Board proceeding, the Court's opinion may
well convince at least some employees contemplating suits against their
unions for breach of the duty of fair representation that inadequate relief is better than none. Good faith is not the determining factor relied
upon by the Board in deciding whether a union has violated sections
8(b) (1) (A), 8(b) (2), or 8(b) (3).'0' It is possible, therefore, that the
Board might find an unfair labor practice, based on the union's failure
'

95

Cox, supra note 176, at 657.
0 See Report of the Comm. on Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer Contracts,
ABA, Section of Labor Relations Law, 33-71 (1954).
2'9Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests, 13 RUTGERs L. REv. 631 (1959).
20' Note 160 supra.
212 The principle has evolved in cases involving employer unfair practices. See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 44' (1954) ("... [S]pecific evidence of intent to encourage
or discourage is not an indispensable element of proof of violation of § 8(a)(3)"); NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (finding of refusal to bargain upheld, despite conclusion that totality
of employer's conduct during pending negotiations did not manifest bad faith). The same rules
would seem to apply in union unfair labor practice cases. Cf. NLRB v. Local 50, American Bakery
& Confcctionary Workers, 339 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 827 (1965).
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to represent fairly, under circumstances in which a court would find no
violation of that duty." 3 Although this type of situation is not unknown
under present law,"0 4 it has obvious disadvantages, and the desirability of
avoiding it constitutes a powerful argument in favor of NLRB preemption
of these cases.
That portion of the majority opinion dealing with suits against employers for breach of contract seems as unfortunate as it was unnecessary.
Assuming that the dicta in Vaca v. Sipes represent the law that will be
applied in an appropriate case, the individual employee who claims that
his employer has violated the collective agreement is without a practical
remedy if his bargaining representative refuses to process the grievance.
He cannot go to the NLRB unless the alleged breach of contract is also
an unfair labor practice. He cannot sue the employer without first exhausting the contract grievance and arbitration procedure. If the union
refuses to process his grievance, the courts will presume, in the absence of
very strong evidence to the contrary, that the union acted in good faith.
This being so, the employee will be barred from suing the employer for
breach of contract because he cannot, as a condition precedent, prove that
the union has denied him fair representation.
This result reminds us once again that the individual employee's right to
sue his employer for wrongful discharge is broader under the RLA than
under the LMRA. Because the railroad employee has no realistic chance of
winning his case before the NRAB, if it is opposed by his bargaining representative, he has no alternative but to forego any demand for reinstatement with back pay; instead, he can sue the employer for damages.
Theoretically, the claim of wrongful discharge is a "minor" dispute within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB; but the Supreme Court has made
it an exception."' In Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R.2 °° the Court explained why:
A common-law or statutory action for wrongful discharge differs from
any remedy which the [Adjustment] Board has power to provide, and does
not involve questions of future relations between the railroad and its other
employees. If a court handling such a case must consider some provisions of
a collective-bargaining agreement, its interpretation would of course have
no binding effect on future interpretation by the Board." 7

Of course, such a cause of action against the employer arises under
state law, not under the RLA. If the state law requires an employee to
20 Possible, but not likely. It is no reflection on the distinguished General Counsel of the NLRB
to suggest that he is more apt to sympathize with the unions, with which he deals on a daily basis,
than with their individual members, whose complaints may not be so readily appreciated by one
removed from the collective bargaining context in which they arise.
2
°4Compare NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 906 (1953), enforcing as modified an NLRB decision holding in part that strikers did not
engage in a secondary boycott in violation of § 8(b) (4) (A) of the NLRA, with United Brick
& Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 919
(1952), involving the same strike and sustaining an award of damages against the union for engaging in a secondary boycott in violation of § 303 of the LMRA.
205Moore v. Illinois Central R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
206339

U.S. 239

2° Id. at 244.

(1950).
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exhaust his remedies under the contract grievance procedure and the
RLA before bringing suit for wrongful discharge, he must comply; 5°
and this process may take years."
Another obstacle to the employee's suit is the doctrine of election of
remedies, which holds that he may proceed either under the RLA for
reinstatement or under state law for damages, but may not do both."'
Thus, if a state law governing the damage action requires the prior exhaustion of contract-statutory remedies under the RLA, the grievant will
automatically be precluded by the election-of-remedies doctrine from
bringing the action for damages after he has exhausted the contractstatutory procedures for securing reinstatement.
In Maddox the Court declared that extension of the RLA precedents
involving individual suits for wrongful discharge is incompatible with the
case law developed under section 301 of the LMRA, as indeed it is, and
strongly intimated that the earlier RLA cases would be overruled at the
first appropriate opportunity." 1 Yet when the opportunity arose, in Walker
v. Southern Ry.,"' the Court, contrary to widespread expectation, reversed
a decision holding that a federal district court was without jurisdiction to
entertain an action for damages by a discharged railroad worker who had
failed to exhaust his contractual and statutory remedies."'
The Court may yet be prepared to overrule, or at least to distinguish,
the earlier decisions in cases arising after 20 June 1966, the effective date
of an amendment to the RLA, 5"' which, it pointed out, "drastically revises the [NRAB] procedures in order to remedy the defects.. ' 12 Meanwhile, however, subject to the limitations previously indicated, a railroad
worker may sue his employer for damages for wrongful discharge without
exhausting contractual or statutory remedies and without having to prove
that his bargaining representative violated its duty of fair representation.
Nothing in the nature of the employments covered by the RLA and
the LMRA requires or justifies this disparity in the rights of employees to
sue their employers for breach of contract. It may be that the more democratic and more flexible grievance and arbitration procedures generally
available to organized workers outside the railroad industry justify a
more rigorous exhaustion rule than that presently obtaining under the
RLA. Neither equity nor logic, however, justifies a rule preventing an
employee from suing his employer for wrongful discharge under a collec& Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953).
In Gunther v. San Diego & A. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257 (1965), for example, plaintiff was discharged in 1954 at age 71. The NRAB issued its reinstatement order in 1959, and the Supreme
Court handed down its decision eleven years after his discharge.
"'Majors v. Thompson, 235 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1956); Bower v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214
F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954).
2. In the words of Justice Black, dissenting, "The Court recognizes the relevance of Moore
aid Koppal and, while declining expressly to overrule them in this case, has raised the overruling
axe so high that its falling is just about as certain as the changing of the seasons." 379 U.S. 650,
667 (1965).
212 385 U.S. 196 (1965).
211 Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White dissented, on the ground that the Court's decision in
Maddox "requires the explicit overruling" of Moore. 385 U.S. at 199.
14Pub. L. No. 89-456, S 1 (20 June 1966). See note 15 supra.
"s385 U.S. at 198.
208Transcontinental
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tive agreement unless he can show that his bargaining representative,

arbitrarily or in bad faith, refused to process his grievance through the
contractual grievance and arbitration machinery. The most he should
have to prove is that the union refused; in this situation its reasons should
be deemed irrelevant.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

An inquiry into the union's duty of fair representation must, sooner
or later, be addressed to the question whether that duty has practical significance in our present system of collective bargaining. The foregoing
discussion suggests that there is a considerable gap between the individual
employee's legal right to enforce the duty and the likelihood that the
courts or administrative bodies will afford him an effective remedy for
its breach.
The legal right, as we have seen, has been rather narrowly circumscribed.
In negotiating a new agreement the union has broad legislative powers,
and courts will not question its good faith or judgment unless the union
has engaged in the most flagrant kind of hostile discrimination against
those whom it represents. In administering the agreement the union holds
complete dominion over the grievance procedure; to all intents and purposes, it "owns" the grievances. Its decision not to process a grievance
through the contract procedure or not to take it to arbitration is also
virtually immune from court review on the merits; so long as the union
has not acted with extreme arbitrariness or in an openly hostile and discriminatory manner, neither a court nor the NLRB is likely to hold that
it has violated its duty of fair representation.
To permit the aggrieved employee to carry any case he wishes to arbitration over the union's objections is neither practical nor desirable. The
union has valid institutional interests of its own to protect, and these
would be seriously endangered if every dissatisfied employee were permitted
to compel arbitration of a grievance based on an interpretation of the collective agreement rejected by the union and the employer. Moreover, it
would be equally inequitable either to require the union to assume the costs
of these arbitrations or to insist that the grievant pay. The former approach
would quickly bankrupt many unions; the latter might make it impossible
for many employees to pursue their legal remedies.
These and other considerations have tended to enforce the prevailing
view that the remedies afforded the complaining employee should be
limited either to a suit against his bargaining representative for breach of
the latter's duty of fair representation or a suit against the employer for
breach of the collective agreement, which might also include the union as
a party defendant under appropriate circumstances. The first of these is
not likely, for the reasons previously mentioned, to provide relief to the
complainant. Perhaps this result can be defended on the ground that some
individual injustice is the unavoidable price we pay to secure the greatest
good for the greatest number in the bargaining unit. It may also be argued
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that serious injustice may not be visited on the complaining employee or
minority group within the unit without the employer's active or tacit
complicity. If the employer becomes involved, the aggrieved employee
need not rely upon a suit against the union based on its alleged failure to
represent him fairly, but may sue the employers or the employer and the
union for breach of contract.
The foregoing argument is subject to some of the same objections advanced against the proposal to permit employees to insist upon arbitration of their grievances when the union is unwilling to do so. If it is inadvisable to permit an employee to press his rejected interpretation of
the collective agreement before an arbitrator, it is no less so to allow him
to proceed in court. A decision in either forum in the employee's favor
might seriously undermine the whole structure of rules and mutual understandings established by the employer and the union, and might also
adversely affect the rights of the great majority of employees in the bargaining unit. Moreover, the time and expense involved in a court case are
likely to be greater than in an arbitration.
In any event, Vaca v. Sipes has introducted a new restriction on the
employee's right to sue for breach of contract that virtually destroys it.
If the Court persists in the view that the employee cannot sue the employer for breach of contract unless he first proves that the union has
violated its duty of fair representation, the chances of recovery will be
all but eliminated in most instances. Only those cases involving flagrant
acts of hostile racial discrimination by both the employer and the union
can now be sure of a hearing on the merits before a court.
I have already suggested that the requirement laid down in Vaca v. Sipes
is a mistake, and that an employee ought to be permitted to sue his employer for breach of contract if he proves that the union, for whatever
reason, has refused to exhaust the contract grievance and arbitration proceeding in the employee's behalf. Admittedly, there is a risk that a court
may, in upholding the employee's claim, construe the collective agreement
in a way that is both naive and potentially disastrous to the collective bargaining relationship between the employer and the union; but if collective bargaining can be made to work only by completely suppressing the
rights and legitimate expectations of individual employees, it is hardly
worth preserving.
The role of the NLRB in this area is as yet somewhat amorphous. It
may be able to afford some relief to employees whose union has not represented them in good faith, on the ground that by violating the duty to
do so, the union has committed one or more unfair labor practices. Even
the most liberal application of that theory, however, would not lead to the
routine enforcement by the Board of the terms of the collective agreement.
In 1947 Congress rejected the proposal that breaches of collective agreements be denominated unfair labor practices; that policy cannot be circumvented by the argument that every alleged employer breach agreed
to or not protested by the union involves a union violation of its duty of
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fair representation and therefore becomes an unfair labor practice for
which the Board can provide relief. Finally, whatever administrative
remedies of this type are made available should not be denied workers
covered by the RLA, just as no court remedies available to railroad and
airline workers should be denied those covered by the LMRAY'
It may be that completely new devices will have to be established in
order to protect the rights of individual employees against the superior
'strength of their employers on .the one hand and their unions on the
other. The United Auto Workers Public Review Board is a step in this
direction, ' but such a mechanism hardly seems feasible for more than a
few unions. Perhaps a number of ombudsmen, appointed by and answerable
to an agency of the federal government, might be helpful in preventing
serious violations of the rights of individual employees within the framework of a government-sanctioned collective bargaining relationship. This
is indeed an area in which much creative research remains to be done.
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